IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF SASKATCHEWAN (CIVIL DIVISION) SASKATOON, SASKATCHEWAN

UNDER THE SMALL CLAIMS ACT

BETWEEN:

DENNIS TOFIN

PLAINTIFF

- and -

SPADINA CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, BENJAMIN GOLDSTEIN, ELAINE MALKIN, MAURICE DUVALL, TOM MCCLOCKLIN JR., TOM MCCLOCKLIN SR., and SANDY REES

DEFENDANTS

April 25, 2012

DECISION

Loewen PCJ

- D. Tofin, appearing on his own behalf
- N. Bardai and C.R. LePage, appearing for the Defendants
- B. Goldstein, appearing on his own behalf

(A TRANSCRIPT OF A RECORDING)

ROYAL REPORTING SERVICES LTD. 300-2010-11TH AVENUE REGINA, SASKATCHEWAN S4P 0J3

1	THE COU	JRT: Good afternoon, gentlemen.
2		I'm a bit later than I hoped to be, but it's just
3		noon, so hopefully we can get out of here in fairly
4		short order.
5		This decision would have been
6		probably a bit more appropriate for a written
7		decision. The problem is I'm in Prince Albert, you
8		are here, and the gist of it would be the same in
9		any event, so I'm going to just give an oral
0		decision that can be transcribed if anybody wants a
1		copy of it at a later. I don't know why you may,
2		but it is possible.
13		In any event, this is an
4		application that has been brought by the solicitors
5		for the defendants who are Spadina Condominium
6		Corporation, Benjamin Goldstein, Elaine Malkin,
7		Maurice Duvall, Tom McClocklin Senior and Junior,
8		and Sandy Rees. There are three claims that are
9		being advanced by the plaintiff. The easiest two
20		are, of course, the ones of smaller monetary value.
21		They are claims numbered two and three in the
22		plaintiff's claim.
23		The plaintiff claims damages
4		under heading two for, it's in paragraph 7, "Liens
25		and interest charges wrongfully collected. My
6		payment of an installment on the original special

assessment was returned to me as being unacceptable as I had specified that my payment was specifically for the capital expenditures stated in the cash call." That claim is for \$2,131.22.

The facts in support of that claim are sketchy to say the least. I can infer, I guess, from the bald statement in paragraph 7 of the plaintiff's claim and some of the evidence that the plaintiff paid money to the corporation, if not in protest, at least to settle all of the call that had been — the cash call that had been made to him, but there is virtually no evidence to support that claim. And based on the balance of my decision, in any event, I don't think that it's appropriate to go any further, and therefore the non-suit is granted with respect to that.

The claim, as it's worded, and I will make comment on that on the other two paragraphs as well, didn't really disclose a triable action. It just said those bald words that I indicated. It's a particular amount sued for with not — no real facts or allegations to support it.

Number three is the \$500 claim for damages to the vehicle. The evidence that I heard was that the plaintiff never submitted an invoice to the board for those \$500 in damages. No

proof of those damages was afforded to this Court.

Nothing was filed and truly that is very clearly grounds for a non-suit, and I will therefore grant it on number two.

The more difficult issue on a non-suit application is in relation to the plaintiff's claim for \$14,025 as contained in paragraph 6 of his claim. Again, the stated claim does not seem to disclose a cause of action. There is no negligence alleged in the claim. There is no bad faith by the board members alleged in the claim. There is no allegation that the board acted unreasonably. And the claim, itself, does not contain an allegation that a two-thirds majority would be required and that failure to meet that two-thirds majority by a membership vote would be a cause of the action.

On a bare assertion of those facts, it seems to me that the claim could fail as it is stated; however, through the course of pretrial and the trial itself and understanding of the issues developed between the parties and by the trial, very clearly, the issue had been defined for me to consider. To boil the issue down, it seems to me that the plaintiff is saying that the board, in reversing a previous board decision, did so in --

sorry, did so not in accordance with the bylaws of the corporation. The bylaws, which are appended as schedule — or tab item D to D1, give direction to the board in certain circumstances. The change in direction of the board that sort of precipitated this action is that when Mr. Tofin was a member of the board, there was a decision, and a valid decision — it's never been questioned — that the heating system be changed or be repaired and that steam boilers be used again as steam had already been a part of the system. Now, as I understand, it was the original system.

On June the 10th, the following year, that decision was overturned. In the meantime, Mr. Tofin was removed from the board and at the June 4th meeting of 2010, the board decided, as they are entitled to, that the original decision would be overturned and a hot water boiler would be used instead of the steam boilers.

The actual decision was not made by the board. It was made at a meeting of the shareholders of the condominium corporation, and it must have been a somewhat heated debate because, at the end of it, a polled vote was called for and the ballots were destroyed. Therefore, we're left not knowing exactly what the vote was, whether it was by

1	two-thirds majority or one-third majority I'm	
2	sorry, or a simple majority.	
3	The definition of what would	
4	cause the board some concern or the corporation some	
5	concern as to whether a two-thirds majority is	
6	required in the circumstances is contained in	
7	Section 11.8 of the bylaws. That section says the	
8	following:	
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	Where expenditures are contemplated by the corporation, which are for the purpose of improving or adding to the common property or common facilities, but are not for repair, renovation, maintenance, or replacement of common property or common facilities, such expenditures may be included in the budget and collected for in the contributions for common expenses, if the same are first approved by a special resolution of unit owners and first mortgagees or other persons entitled to vote.	
24	So, in other words, if this work would qualify as	
25	that type of work, then a special resolution would	
26	be required.	
27	Section 10.1 of the same	
28 29 60	bylaw reads as follows: The corporation shall keep in a state of	
31 32 33 34 35	good and serviceable repair and properly maintain the common property. The corporation shall additionally maintain and repair including renewal, where reasonably necessary, pipes, wires, cables, and ducts	
36 37	for the time being existing in the parcel and capable of being used in connection with	

ROYAL REPORTING SERVICES LTD.

the enjoyment of one or more unit of the common property.

2 3 4

The defendants say that this is a maintenance and repair issue. The plaintiff says it is not, that it is more than that as Section 11.8 contemplates.

In my view, this is

maintenance or repair. There is no addition to the property as referred to in Section 11.8. In fact, 10.1 seems to contemplate exactly what occurred in this case, namely a replacement of things that include pipes, wires, cables, and ducts, so in my view, this is a repair and maintenance issue.

Section 11.8 contemplates something that might change some of the fundamentals of the building. In this case, as it was, in my view, a repair and maintenance item, the only issue—the only thing that needed to be done was changes to the heating and air conditioning systems. When you put in a heating and air conditioning system, it has a shelf life, so to speak. It must fall on some board, at some point in time down the road, to make some decisions as to what to do when it fails or when it's about to fail, and that is pretty much exactly what happened in this situation. The board had received reports that the boiler system was failing or about to fail and took some good long time, actually, and a reasonable length of time to

make a final decision as to how to repair it.

In any event, the evidence otherwise does not disclose any reason to question the board's decision, other than this two-thirds special resolution sort of an issue. The board is required, as I think is common ground among all of us here today, to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation. The board is entitled to be wrong. In any event, if that was the case, I don't know how that could attract any liability of the board. In fact, in this case, the board were not wrong.

The evidence of the plaintiff's own experts was that the original decision to put in hot water was something that was supported by both of them. It was supported for the reasons that it would save money for the corporation in the long run and the evidence is that that indeed did happen. Mr. Tofin offered his view of bills and whatnot for the building, but I don't think I can accept that in preference and contradiction to the evidence of his own experts. It seems to me that what was anticipated by the experts at the beginning turned out to be quite right and the board was quite prudent and reasonable in coming to their conclusion and, therefore, there are no grounds, in my view, to

1	hold the board or any member liable.
2	It seems to me that the
3	plaintiff was offended because his original plan
4	when he was a board member was overturned. He was
5	removed prior to that from the board and perhaps his
6	feelings were hurt and he was bound and determined,
7	as it were, to stick to his guns. That doesn't, in
8	my view, afford him a cause of action.
9	Reference was made during the
10	claim to a second demand letter that is contained in
11	the defendants' Exhibit 1, the book of documents at
12	Tab I. It is the bulk of that demand letter
13	would have or was advanced on the basis of
14	"unapproved capital expenditures," which is the
15	exact wording that was used with respect to the
16	demand letter that preceded this law suit and, in my
17	view, would have offended Section 5 of The Small
18	Claims Act, which reads:
19 20 21 22 23	No person shall divide a claim or counterclaim that exceeds the monetary limit into two or more claims or counterclaims.
24	In my view, if the plaintiff
25	was aware of that and should have been aware of
26	that, it is, in any event, the law and it properly
27	if he is serious about bringing that claim, it

should have properly been brought in this action and

28

1 would have been dealt with in the same fashion. 2 The test for a non-suit --3 I'm reading this a little later than would normally 4 be on a -- in a written decision, but the test for a 5 law suit is, indeed, as claimed in the Kvello v. Miazga decision, and I want to read that in for the 6 7 record. Paragraph 16 reads: 8 The general legal test to be applied in 9 determining non-suit applications is well 10 established. It is whether a prima facie 11 case has been made out at the conclusion of 12 the plaintiffs' case in the sense that a reasonable trier of fact could find in the 13 14 plaintiffs' favour on the basis of the 15 uncontradicted adduced evidence. Where the 16 nature of the case requires the drawing of 17 inferences of fact from other facts 18 established by direct evidence, the test 19 includes the question of whether the 20 inferences that the plaintiffs seek could 21 reasonably be drawn from the direct evidence 22 adduced if the trier of fact chooses to 23 accept the direct evidence of fact. 24 I'm -- in making -- drawing 25 my conclusion, speaking a bit more in the 26 vernacular, it seems to me that I have to look at 27 the defendants and say, is there a case for them to meet? And, at the end of the day, on the basis of 28 29 the evidence I have heard, there is no such case. 30 If I am wrong in that, the 31 plaintiff, in any event, is enjoying the benefits of

the work. He had an opportunity at an earlier

32

```
1
            occasion in his Queen's Bench suit that was
 2
            commenced to stop the work if he wanted to.
 3
            now living with the consequences of the repairs that
 4
            were done. The board, as I said earlier, acted in
5
            good faith reasonably and the plaintiff, as an
6
            owner, is enjoying the fruits of that labour, so to
7
            speak.
 8
                                   So the application, I think,
9
            is well-founded and the claim is dismissed as -- on
10
            the basis of the non-suit application. I don't know
11
            what to say further, gentlemen.
12
    MR. BARDAI:
                                   Your Honour --
13
    THE COURT:
                                   Yeah.
14
    MR. BARDAI:
                                   -- I think that we all
15
           understand. There was one issue that was raised in
16
           the Statement of Claim dealing with reimbursement
17
            for heaters, which wasn't addressed in your
18
           decision. I just want to -- I think it's covered
19
           off by the overall decision, but I didn't hear it
20
            addressed specifically, so --
21
    THE COURT:
                                   Yeah, I didn't say heaters,
22
           but I did refer to the first -- or the second and
23
           third heads.
24
    MR. BARDAI:
                                   That is correct.
25
    THE COURT:
                                   And one was the -- no, you're
           right. I did miss the heaters, yeah. That was a
26
```

10

1		decision that Mr.	. Tofin made on his own and he did
2		so. I'm not sure	e why he would be just as a as
3		an owner in the b	ouilding, be buying heaters for
4		other members. I	It just doesn't make a whole lot of
5		sense. And, in a	any event, that is not, in my view,
6		his proper place	to do. Had it been just for his
7		own heater, there	e may have been some claim that he
8		could have advanc	ced, but there was no evidence to
9		show how much his	s cost, and it's pretty much I
10	think the reasoning would apply to it as well, so		
11	it's dismissed as well.		
12			The only other issue I can
13		think of is costs	s, but, in a case like this, I don't
14		know whether it w	would be appropriate to address.
15	MR.	BARDAI:	Your Honour, we know the rule
16		on costs.	
17	THE	COURT:	Yeah.
18	MR.	BARDAI:	It's a filing fee.
19	THE	COURT:	Yeah.
20	MR.	BARDAI:	It's
21	THE	COURT:	It's almost trivial.
22	MR.	BARDAI:	It is.
23	THE	COURT:	Okay, so on that basis, the
24		plaintiff's claim	is dismissed in its entirety and
25		we can all go hom	ne.
26		END	OF PROCEEDINGS

IN THE MATTER OF DENNIS TOFIN v. SPADINA CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, BENJAMIN GOLDSTEIN, ELAINE MALKIN, MAURICE DUVALL, TOM MCCLOCKLIN JR., TOM MCCLOCKLIN SR., and SANDY REES

AFFIDAVIT OF COURT TRANSCRIBER UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT.

I, RHONDA COOMBS, Court Transcriber, HEREBY MAKE OATH AND SAY, that the foregoing typewritten pages being One (1) to Eleven (11), inclusive, contain a true and correct transcription of the recorded proceedings taken herein, to the best of my knowledge, skill and ability.

SWORN BEFORE ME at Regina,)
Saskatchewan, this	
day of May, 2012)

A COMMISSIONER FOR OATHS in and for the Province of Saskatchewan. My Commission expires: